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 Fiduciary Duties of Credit Brokers: McWilliam v Norton 
Finance 
 
 
In McWilliam v Norton Finance (UK) Ltd1 the Court of Appeal examined the circumstances 
in which an independent credit broker owes fiduciary duties to its consumer clients, and is 
liable to account for commissions received without their informed consent. The court ruled 
unanimously that fiduciary duties arise between a broker and its client where the client is 
unsophisticated and places trust and confidence in the broker, irrespective of whether the 
transaction is an information-only sale or an advised sale. In these circumstances, the broker 
is liable to account to its client for commissions that were not fully disclosed and consented 
to by the client.   
 
 
A. THE FACTS 
 
Mr and Mrs McWilliam (“the claimants”) contacted Norton Finance UK Ltd (“Norton”), an 
independent credit broker, to inquire about a loan of around £25,000 and payment protection 
insurance (“PPI”). Norton informed them that a loan was available and that only one PPI 
product was available with that loan. The claimants signed an application form whereby they 
acknowledged and consented to the fact that Norton would receive a commission from the 
lender upon loan completion. Subsequently, they received several other documents, including 
the Finance Industry Standards Association (“FISA”) Borrower Information Guide, which 
stated that, unless notified otherwise, the broker would receive commission from the lending 
company. They also received a Demands and Needs statement, which specified that the 
transaction was an information-only sale and the claimants retained discretion to decide how 
to proceed. 
The claimants agreed to pay Norton a broker fee and a completion fee. Norton did not 
specify to the claimants that the amount of the commission from the lender was £2,675, and 
that it would receive an additional commission for arranging the PPI in amount of £1,685.25, 
or 45% of the premium. Following repayment of the loan, the claimants alleged that Norton 
                                                          
1 [2015] EWCA Civ 186, [2015] 1 All ER (Comm) 1026. 
 had received the two commissions in breach of the fiduciary duties owed to them, and 
claimed that Norton should account to them for these commissions. 
 
 
B. THE COURT DECISIONS 
 
Some controversies arose during the preliminary stages of the litigation as to which entity 
actually received the allegedly secret commissions. In an attempt to save time and costs, 
Norton admitted that it had received the commissions. Subsequently, it sought to withdraw 
this admission. Based on largely unchallenged evidence that the commissions had in fact 
been received by a third party, the trial judge concluded that the most practical way forward 
was to treat Norton’s earlier admissions as withdrawn, although no formal application was 
made to that effect. Consequently, it was not necessary for the court to make any further 
findings, as Norton was not the recipient of the allegedly secret commissions. Nevertheless, 
the judge held, obiter, that she would have concluded that there was no contractual relation 
between Norton and the claimants and no fiduciary duties were owed.2  
The claimants appealed. Tomlinson LJ gave the lead judgment, with which Mitting LJ 
and Sir Robin Jacob agreed. The Court of Appeal had to consider three main issues: 
 
(a) whether the trial judge was right to allow Norton to withdraw its admission; 
(b) whether Norton owed fiduciary duties to the claimants; and 
(c) if fiduciary duties were owed, whether Norton had breached them.  
 
On the first point, the court held that, due to procedural flaws, Norton should have been held 
to its initial admission. The trial court handled this issue inadvertently and reached a decision 
“which was in all the circumstances unjust.”3 This conclusion allowed the court to proceed to 
the substantive questions surrounding the fiduciary duties claim. 
  The first step was to identify the nature of the relationship between Norton and the 
claimants. Tomlinson LJ observed that Norton undertook several tasks for which it received a 
broker fee from the claimants. Following Sumption LJ’s judgment in Plevin v Paragon 
                                                          
2 Norton Finance at para 6, referring to the judgment of Mrs Recorder McMullen of 
Middlesbrough County Court. 
3 Para 29. 
 Personal Finance Ltd,4 Tomlinson LJ held that the parties entered into a contractual agency 
relationship.5  
  The existence of a contract of agency, Tomlinson LJ rightly noted, does not elucidate 
the point regarding the existence of fiduciary duties. A further fact-finding exercise needs to 
be undertaken, to determine whether the essential elements that give rise to fiduciary duties 
exist on the facts of the case. Drawing on Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency6 and Bristol and 
West Building Society v Mothew,7 Tomlinson LJ concluded that the central point that 
determines the fiduciary duties question is whether Norton was acting in a capacity that 
involved reposing trust and confidence by the claimants.8  
  In examining the trust and confidence element, the court considered two further 
factors: the claimants’ level of financial sophistication and the provision of advice by Norton. 
On the first point, Tomlinson LJ held that the claimants were not financially sophisticated. 
Although they were not “non-status” borrowers and were reasonably competent in financial 
transactions, they were nevertheless vulnerable “in that they had debt which was for them 
substantial in respect of which they needed assistance in finding a loan.”9 The claimants were 
vulnerable and reposed trust in Norton to provide them with the best possible deal, which 
gave rise to “a paradigm instance” of a fiduciary relationship.10     
  On the second point, Tomlinson LJ considered whether the provision of financial 
advice or recommendation was essential for the existence of fiduciary duties. He commented 
that the trial judge erred in regarding Hurstanger Limited v Wilson11 as distinguishable on the 
basis that Norton offered no advice or recommendation. He interpreted Tuckey LJ’s 
reasoning in Hurstanger as holding that provision of recommendation or advice by the broker 
was irrelevant for the existence of fiduciary duties. The critical factor was the trust, 
confidence and reliance that the claimants placed on Norton, which left the former vulnerable 
to the latter’s disloyalty. At the same time, however, Tomlinson LJ noted that Norton offered 
a form of recommendation, by implicitly representing that the contract it offered to the 
                                                          
4 [2014] UKSC 61, [2015] 1 All ER 625. 
5 Para 39. 
6 P G Watts, Bowstead & Reynolds On Agency, 19th edn (2010). 
7 [1998] Ch 1 [1996] 4 All ER 698. 
8 Para 40. 
9 Para 41. 
10 Para 43. 
11 [2007] EWCA Civ 299, [2007] 4 All ER 1118. 
 claimants was the “the most competitive to which they had access" and “the best possible 
deal”.12   
  Tomlinson LJ concluded the fiduciary duties point by stating that the trial court “was 
bound by Hurstanger to find that the relationship between Norton and the Claimants was a 
fiduciary one, and so are we.”13 As a fiduciary, Norton had a duty not to act for its own 
benefit or for the benefit of a third party without the informed consent of the claimants.  
  The final point that the court considered was whether the claimants gave informed 
consent to the commissions received by Norton from the lender and the insurance provider. 
Tomlinson LJ found that the standard statements in the loan documentation did not amount to 
adequate disclosure. Norton did not inform the claimants of the actual quantum of any of the 
commission payments it received, nor of the fact that the PPI commission amounted to 45% 
of the premium.  
Consequently, the claimants’ consent was not adequately informed, and Norton was 
liable to account for the amount of the two commissions with interest.14 
 
 
C. ANALYSIS 
 
This decision is predictable and unsettling at the same time. It is predictable in that it follows 
the precedent established in Hurstanger, where the same court described the relationship 
between an independent credit broker and its client as “obviously a fiduciary one”.15 In 
Hurstanger the issue of fiduciary duties was not argued before the court, because it was 
agreed it existed. In Norton Finance the court had the opportunity to clarify when and why 
brokers become fiduciaries to their clients. Its cursory and confusing treatment of the 
elements required for finding fiduciary duties in the broker-client relationship, however, left 
many unanswered questions.  
 It is respectfully suggested that the court’s identification of trust and confidence as the 
crucial factor that determines the existence of fiduciary duties is highly contestable. Courts 
and academic commentators increasingly recognise that, although trust and confidence are 
frequently used to describe fiduciary relations, their presence is not a clear indicator of 
                                                          
12 Para 44. 
13 Para 48. 
14 Para 56. 
15 Hurstanger at para 33 per Tuckey LJ. 
 fiduciary duties.16 Fiduciary duties cannot be imposed unilaterally by the beneficiary’s trust 
and confidence or reliance on the fiduciary. A beneficiary’s trust, reliance or expectations of 
loyalty must be legitimate,17 and the investigation of legitimacy points to a voluntary 
undertaking by the fiduciary.18 Moreover, trust and confidence may exist in other contractual, 
non-fiduciary relations, or may be absent from relations that give rise to fiduciary duties.19    
 Similarly, vulnerability is often associated with fiduciary duties but is not a critical 
factor. Vulnerability is also present in the equitable doctrines of undue influence and 
unconscionability, which are distinct from the fiduciary doctrine.20 Moreover, Tomlinson 
LJ’s explanation that the claimants were vulnerable because they had significant debt and 
needed assistance to find a loan is not persuasive.21 Many borrowers enter into loan 
agreements to consolidate existing debt, but it is difficult to accept that all of them are 
vulnerable and need protection by fiduciary duties.   
 Discretionary power, it is submitted, is the most relevant factor in determining the 
occurrence of fiduciary duties in private law relations. The no-conflict and no-profit fiduciary 
rules apply whenever a person has authority, or power, to decide how to advance the interests 
of the other party to the relationship. This is not simply a power to alter the beneficiary’s 
legal position, as the court stated.22 Many persons hold powers that affect the interests of 
others, without being bound by fiduciary duties in exercising them. Non-fiduciary or personal 
powers, such as the power of appointment held in personal rather than fiduciary capacity, the 
power to renew or terminate unilaterally a contract, or the power to accelerate repayment of a 
demand loan, change the legal position of others but are subject to lesser duties than fiduciary 
powers.23   
 Did Norton hold discretionary power? In considering the relevant facts, Tomlinson LJ 
noted on several occasions that the claimants were informed that Norton provided only 
information on the sale and no advice or recommendations, and that the clients retained 
                                                          
16 See P Hood, Principles of Lender Liability (2012) 250. 
17 See M Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty (2010) 254-260. 
18 See L Smith, “Fiduciary relationships: ensuring the loyal exercise of judgement on behalf 
of another” (2014) 130 LQR 608 at 612; J Edelman, “When do fiduciary duties arise?” 
(2010) 126 LQR 302 at 302.  
19 Hood, Principles (n 15) 251. 
20 P D Finn, “The Fiduciary Principle”, in T G Youdan (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trust 
(1989) 1 at 32. 
21 Para 41.  
22 Para 40. 
23 G Thomas, Thomas on Powers, 2nd edn (2012) 474. 
 discretion to make their own choice about how to proceed. The trial judge found these 
elements to be indicative of the absence of fiduciary duties. The Court of Appeal’s evaluation 
of these factors is confusing. On the one hand it held that Norton did in fact exercise a certain 
degree of discretion, albeit not enough to qualify as advice in the regulatory sense. Norton 
provided an implicit recommendation by indicating that it offered the most competitive deal 
in the market.24 On the other hand it stated that this exercise of discretion was irrelevant for 
finding fiduciary duties.25  
The latter statement finds little support in the academic literature on fiduciary duties 
of financial intermediaries, and on fiduciary relations more generally. Brokers who act as 
order-takers, provide execution-only services and have no discretion do not owe fiduciary 
duties.26 The existence of the discretionary power to promote the interests of the beneficiary 
is the very reason why the law imposes the strict no-conflict and no-profit duties on 
fiduciaries.27 Consequently, the strict fiduciary law principles should not be binding on 
brokers and other intermediaries who provide no advice and have no discretionary power to 
promote the interests of their clients. Nevertheless, these actors may owe obligations of 
enhanced disclosure and fairness towards their clients based on relevant regulatory or 
professional ethics provisions, rather than under fiduciary principles. The non-fiduciary 
duties of disclosure, however, do not normally attract the far-reaching remedies associated 
with breach of fiduciary duties.          
 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
 
Courts should proceed with the utmost restraint when faced with allegations of breach of 
fiduciary duties that are “scattered throughout the pleadings with complete abandon.”28 A 
successful fiduciary duties claim has many advantages, and an obligation to account for 
unauthorised benefits is among the most attractive.       
                                                          
24 Para 44. 
25 Para 46. 
26 Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries (Law Com No 350, 2014) para 10.30. The 
position in Scots Law appears to be similar. See L Macgregor, The Law of Agency in 
Scotland (2013) 118; D Cabrelli, “Scotland” in D Busch and D Demott (eds), Liability of 
Asset Managers (2012) 507 at 510. 
27 L Smith, “Deterrence, prophylaxis and punishment in fiduciary obligations” (2013) 7 
Journal of Equity 87. 
28 P J Millet, “Equity's place in the law of commerce” (1998) 114 LQR 214 at 217. 
  In Norton Finance, the Court of Appeal succumbed to the allure of fiduciary duties to 
achieve justice on the facts of the case. The decision is salutary in that it creates a greater 
level of protection for consumers, who often lack financial expertise and are at the mercy of 
financial intermediaries. The court’s reasons for this equitable result, however, do not stand 
close examination. The court’s hasty evaluation of the fundamental fiduciary law principles 
perpetuates the uncertainty prevailing in this area of law. It is not clear how this decision will 
affect other financial and non-financial intermediaries who act as order-takers, do not provide 
professional advice and receive various commissions. 
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